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I. INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the individ-
ual’s right to own private property without interference from the gov-
ernment.1  However, possibly as a result of relatively scant historical
documentation of the founder’s original intent in framing the Fifth
Amendment as a limitation on the government’s power of eminent
domain, the interpretation of the Takings Clause has evolved signifi-
cantly over time.2  Generally, governmental takings must satisfy two
requirements: (1) the property must be taken for a public use; and (2)
the owner must be justly compensated for his land.3  While early case
law exclusively describes land taken for public use as including “forts,
armories, and arsenals, . . . navy-yards and light houses, for custom
houses, post offices, and court houses,”4 the broad modern view of
† Third year law student at Touro Law Center, member of the Touro Law Re-
view, Municipal Law Fellow, and Honors Scholar.
I would like to thank Professor Sarah Adams-Schoen for her guidance and
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States., 91 U.S. 367, 368 (1875); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see generally
Sara B. Falls, Waking A Sleeping Giant: Revisiting the Public Use Debate Twenty-Five
Years After Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 355 (2005).
3. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476.
4. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
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public use includes expansive concepts such as economic revitaliza-
tion.5  This expansion of the definition of what constitutes a public use
is beyond the scope of the founders’ intent.  The individual’s right to
property is an enumerated fundamental right of the Fifth Amend-
ment,6 and any purported violation of this right must be met with the
same strict scrutiny by the courts as any other violation of a funda-
mental right.
This Comment will deal with the evolution of the public use re-
quirement in Part II.  Part III deals with the unnecessary expansion of
the definition of a public use.  In Part IV I will argue why the courts
should return to a public use definition in line with the intent of the
Fifth Amendment as written by the founders.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment provides that: “No person shall be . . . de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”7  Much of the debate over the meaning of the Takings Clause is
fueled by the interpretation of historical documentation regarding its
drafting and inclusion in the Bill of Rights.8  Additionally, this area of
law has grown increasingly controversial, as clear definitions of prop-
erty, taking, and public use have not been agreed upon.  For example,
property has been vaguely described as “an elaborate bundle of cus-
toms, rights, expectations, and obligations regarding the relationships
among individuals, society, and the state.”9  In some instances, such as
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Justice writing the
majority opinion outlines a number of different definitions of
property.10
An explanation of the right to property has proven to be equally
elusive.  While it is generally accepted by modern legal scholars11 that
Lord William Blackstone has come closest to defining the right to
property as “the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all . . . acquisi-
5. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding
of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1246 (2002); Jonathan
Lahn, The Uses of History in the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233, 1260 (2006).
9. Daniel A. Ippolito, An Originalist’s Evaluation of Modern Takings Jurispru-
dence, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 317, 322 (1995) (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES
KRIEIR, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993)).
10. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987); Andrea L.
Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of
Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1316 n.7 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Ippolito, supra note 9, at 322 n.36; Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1630, 1635 (1988).
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tions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the
land,”12 even this definition fails to provide a clear demarcation of
what interest in property the Constitution purportedly protects.   For
example, it is not clear whether under Lord Blackstone’s definition a
local land ordinance requiring a permit for tree removal would qualify
as a “law of the land” that would hinder a landowner’s “free use” of
his property.
The definition of a taking is more concrete, but nevertheless is not
without its own share of controversy.  In the area of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, a taking of property can occur in two ways.  The first is
a direct, physical taking, the definition of which is relatively uncon-
troversial.13  The other, far more contentious taking is known as a reg-
ulatory taking.14  A regulatory taking occurs when the government
enacts a regulation that takes away an intangible property right, or
diminishes property value by limiting its use.15  While a number of
modern commentators have interpreted the Takings Clause to regu-
late only direct, physical takings of property,16 the Supreme Court has
recognized regulatory takings as well.17  However, the Court, by its
own admission, has never provided a justification for the rule of regu-
latory takings.18  Nevertheless, the Court has frequently held that
when regulation denies any economically beneficial use of the land, a
regulatory taking has occurred.19
Just as a firm definition of property and a taking has proven elusive,
so has a definition of a public use.  The definition of public use has
evolved along with society, environmental science, and the progres-
sion of the function of government in the forum of property develop-
12. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES AT 138.
13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (showing a “direct
appropriation” of property is covered under the Takings Clause).
14. See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct,
Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far”, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 242 (1999) (“It is
quite possible, but far from clear, that the original understanding of the Takings
Clause included regulatory takings. Original intent may raise questions regarding the
current incarnation of regulatory takings law, but it hardly resolves the question of
whether regulatory takings deserve compensation generally.”).
15. Id. at 232  n.314; see also Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165, 170 (1859) (requiring
compensation for regulation that took usage rights from landowners by requiring
them to allow others to graze cattle on their land).
16. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985).
17. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–1016 (“As we have said on numerous occasions,
the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ‘does not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.’”) (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 1017 (“We have never set forth the justification for [the regulatory tak-
ings] rule. Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.”).
19. Id. at 1019.
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ment.20  At first, public uses encompassed takings simply for “use by
the public,”21 and included, for example, the taking of private land for
the purpose of building railroad tracks.22
However, as eminent domain cases became more complex and the
line between public and private use became blurred, courts found this
standard to be unworkable.23 Recently, the Court has gone so far as to
include economic revitalization—from blight removal to simply ac-
quiring and developing land for the purpose of increased tax reve-
nue—greatly expanding the government’s power of eminent
domain.24
Broadly speaking, a two-step test is used when determining whether
a taking for a public use violates the Constitution.25  The state must
first show that its use of eminent domain is rational, and then prove
the taking is related to a conceivable governmental purpose.26  Nota-
bly, this level of judicial scrutiny is highly deferential to the govern-
ment, normally reserved for rights deemed by the courts to not be
fundamental under the Constitution.
A. Early Eminent Domain Doctrine
In order to better understand the significance of the public use doc-
trine in the Takings Clause, we must first examine its history. The
power of eminent domain (a phrase coined in the seventeenth century
by the legal scholar Hugo Grotius) is broadly defined as the sover-
eign’s inherent power to have control over its own lands,27 and has
been traced as far back as the Early Roman Empire.28 In England, the
sovereign power of the king to acquire any property deemed neces-
sary to the crown was remarkably broad.29 Further, the land taken by
the king was routinely taken without compensation to the land-
owner.30  In contrast, property acquisition was markedly different in
the colonies, as settlers were given sole title of small plots of land
upon arriving in America.31
20. 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 44 (2014).
21. See Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896).
22. Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, C. & D.R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 201 (1832).
23. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005).
24. See id. at 483.
25. Id. at 476.
26. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
27. Katherine M. McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin:
The Mandate for Stricter Scrutiny for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 144 (2004).
28. Steven E. Buckingham, Case Comment, The Kelo Threshold: Private Property
and Public Use Reconsidered, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1295 n.127 (2005).
29. McFarland, supra note 27, at 145.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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The founders sought to permanently protect the citizens’ right to
property.32  One of the most vocal sponsors of this protection, James
Madison, stated, “Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort.  This being the end of government, that alone is a just gov-
ernment, which impartially secures to every man, whatever his
own.”33  While Madison recognized eminent domain as a power inher-
ent in the sovereign, he was greatly influenced by the writings of John
Locke, who was a staunch advocate for personal property rights.34
Therefore, by requiring that land taken be for a public use,35 it ap-
pears Madison intended to limit the government from arbitrarily tak-
ing land.36
Early American Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the Fifth
Amendment recognized the power of eminent domain as essential to
that of a sovereign government.37  The practice of eminent domain has
historically been used in the United States to procure land for building
public utilities such as railroads, public roads, schools, and post of-
fices.38  This was generally accepted in early American society, as the
federal government was not forced to cite the power of eminent do-
main in a Supreme Court case until 1875.39
In Kohl v. United States,40 the federal government invoked the
power of eminent domain to procure lands in Cincinnati to be used
for a post office.41  The Court took the opportunity to lay a strong
judicial foundation for the protection of the government’s power of
eminent domain.  Furthermore, the Court held that the eminent do-
main powers vested “by the Constitution in the general government
32. Id.
33. McFarland, supra note 27 at 142 (citing James Madison, Property National Ga-
zette (Philadelphia) Mar. 29, 1772, at 174).
34. Id. at 145; William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 817 n.185 (1995).
35. See Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of
the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2002) (explaining that
an argument has been made that the text of the Takings Clause requires the govern-
ment to compensate landowners only for land taken for a public use and takings via
taxation are not compensable; therefore, the public use language in the Fifth Amend-
ment is meant to be descriptive, not proscriptive).
36. See generally McFarland, supra note 27, at 145; Treanor supra note 16, at 709
(discussing further evidence of Madison’s intention to protect citizens’ rights to
property).
37. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 48 U.S. 185, 194 (1849) (“It is not
questioned that land within a State purchased by the United States as a mere proprie-
tor, and not reserved or appropriated to any special purpose, may be liable to con-
demnation for streets or highways, like the land of other proprietors, under the rights
of eminent domain.”).
38. See City of Chicago, 48 U.S. at 194.
39. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); see also Donald J. Kochan,
“Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998).
40. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 367.
41. Id. at 377.
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demand for their exercise the acquisition of land in all States.”42  Just
as each person is a citizen of his state, and subject to each state’s
power of eminent domain, so too are the individual states subject to
the eminent domain power of the federal government.43  Thus, the
issue in Kohl was as much about the issue of eminent domain as it was
about federalism.  The Court delineated a helpful list of public uses,
including “forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and light
houses, for custom houses, post offices, and court houses,” that could
be used by the federal government as a framework for legitimate pub-
lic uses.44  By giving examples of proper public uses, the Court made
clear that the acquisition of land by the federal government cannot be
contingent on the approval of any private citizen or state government.
Instead, the government may take an individual’s land against his will,
as long as the use is for an acceptable public purpose.45  This was the
Court’s first attempt at balancing individual property rights with the
government’s power of eminent domain.
B. “Protecting the Public Welfare” as a Public Use
As the United States recovered from the Second World War, the
government began to pass nationwide programs aimed at redevelop-
ing economically depressed urban areas.46  Congress passed one such
program, called the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, in
1945.47  The purpose of the Act was to condemn economically dis-
tressed areas in the District of Columbia and redevelop the land
through a designated agency appointed by Congress.  Residential
property owners within one targeted area (whose property was not
itself economically distressed but was surrounded by distressed prop-
erty) brought suit challenging the power of Congress to use its emi-
nent domain power to obtain property “merely to develop a more
balanced, attractive community.”48
In 1954, the Supreme Court responded by expanding upon the list
of justifications for the use of eminent domain for the first time since
Kohl.49  In Berman v. Parker, a unanimous Court held in favor of the
government’s plan for using eminent domain for the purpose of eco-
nomic redevelopment.50 The Court held that Congress had made a
legislative determination that the land needed to be condemned and
acquired using its eminent domain powers for the benefit of the public
42. Id. at 368.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
46. Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in Eminent
Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119, 1121 (2011).
47. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 98 (1954).
48. Id. at 101–02.
49. Id.
50. Kohl, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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welfare, a concept the Court described as “broad and inclusive.”51
Protecting the public welfare, the Court stated, is inherent in the po-
lice powers of each state.52 Public welfare is defined as a product of
“legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete
definition.”53
Within this concept of protecting the public welfare, Congress is re-
sponsible for making determinations with regard to the health, cleanli-
ness, and balance of the community.54  Once Congress has made its
determinations using a wide variety of values, it is not the job of the
judiciary to reassess them.55  The Court went on to describe the gov-
ernment’s power of eminent domain as a means to an end.56  The
method of acquisition is irrelevant, as long as Congress has deter-
mined that the acquisition itself is for a public purpose.57
The Berman decision was significant for a number of reasons.  First,
it greatly expanded the government’s power to acquire property.  As
long as the legislative body invoking its eminent domain power does
so for the purpose of a public use, as defined by that same legislative
body, the judiciary has no basis for review.58  Further, in an effort to
avoid a holdout by a single landowner, the Court again deferred to the
legislature to determine the breadth of each project, as “community
redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on
a piecemeal basis.”59  By disavowing even a rational basis of review,
the Court arguably relinquished any responsibility for reviewing legis-
lative public use determinations.60  In announcing that public use de-
terminations are inherent in the police powers of the State, the Court
placed such determinations outside the purview of the judiciary to
examine.
Finally, the Court acknowledged that blight removal, in addition to
slum clearance, is well within the definition of a public use.61  Prior to
the Berman decision, eminent domain was used by legislators for the
clearance of inner city slums.62  Following Berman, not only does the
legislature have an interest in clearing unlivable housing, it also has
the power to “determine that the community should be beautiful as
51. Id.
52. Berman, 348 U.S. at 102.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 103 (citing Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529–30 (1894)).
56. Id.
57. Berman, 348 U.S. at 103.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 104.
60. McFarland, supra note 27, at 148.
61. Berman, 348 U.S. at 103–04.
62. See Olga V. Kotlyarevskaya, “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain
Cases Based on Slum Clearance, Elimination of Urban Blight, and Economic Develop-
ment, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 203 (2006).
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well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.”63  Due to this abstract expansion of what consti-
tutes a public purpose, legislatures have been granted almost unfet-
tered access to private property for any conceivable reason.
C. Public Use Examined Under Rational Basis Scrutiny
Thirty years after the Berman decision, the Supreme Court was
again confronted with the issue of the public use doctrine in Hawaii v.
Midkiff.64  In the 1950s and 1960s, the ownership of Hawaiian land
gradually became more consolidated into a land oligopoly; whereby
the vast majority of the land in Hawaii was owned by a relatively small
percentage of the population, with the remainder of citizens as lessors
of smaller parcels.65  In order to “reduce the perceived social and eco-
nomic evils” of this system of land ownership, the Hawaiian legisla-
ture enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967.66  The Act formed a
system of condemnation whereby title of the smaller parcels of land
were taken from the lessors and transferred to the lessees in order to
reduce the concentration of land ownership.67  The determination of
whether or not the state’s acquisition of each parcel of land was to
“effectuate the public purposes” of the Act was made individually by
the Hawaiian Housing Authority.68  This led the relatively few land-
owners of Hawaii to challenge the law based on their claim that the
condemnation of their property for sale to their lessees violated the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice O’Connor wrote a unanimous opinion that built upon the
definition of public use described in Berman as “coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”69 However, the Court acknowl-
edged in Berman a role for the courts to play in reviewing the judg-
ment of a legislature as to what constitutes a public use, albeit “an
extremely narrow one.”70  This extremely narrow form of judicial re-
view may come only when the public use determination is “shown to
involve an impossibility.”71  In order to avoid judicial interference in
legislative findings, the Court may only examine a public use determi-
nation if the use is “palpably without reasonable foundation.”72  Thus,
the Midkiff Court outlined some sort of judicial check on the power of
the legislature to condemn property for a public use, albeit a relatively
small one.
63. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
64. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
65. Id. at 229.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 230.
68. Id.
69. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 241.
72. Id. (citing United States. v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
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In doing so, the Court introduced what is commonly known as a
rational basis of review for public use determinations.  When the exer-
cise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the Court will find the taking to be within the bound-
ary of the Fifth Amendment.73  In applying this basis of review, the
Midkiff Court had no trouble finding that Hawaii’s Land Reform Act
of 1967 was constitutional.74  The Court saw the Act as a comprehen-
sive and rational approach to curing a market failure.75  Whether this
approach would actually correct the market failure was irrelevant be-
cause the constitutional public use requirement is “satisfied as long as
the legislature rationally could have believed that the Act would pro-
mote its objective.”76
In the latter part of its decision, the Court dealt with the issue of
whether or not this transfer of land was a purely private taking, as was
contended by the Hawaiian landowners.  A purely private taking, that
is, a taking for no reason other than to “confer a private benefit on a
particular private party,” cannot survive the scrutiny of the public use
requirement.77 However, in this case the Court found the Act not to
benefit a particular class of individuals, but to “attack certain per-
ceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii—a legiti-
mate public purpose.”78  As this public purpose was not irrational in
the eyes of the Court, the requirements of the Fifth Amendment were
met.
D. “Public Purpose” as a Public Use
In 2005, the Court again tackled the issue of what constitutes a pub-
lic use.  In Kelo v. City of New London, the Court was forced to di-
rectly decide whether legislatures may use economic revitalization as a
justification for exercising their eminent domain powers.79
The decision addressed a development plan approved by the City of
New London, Connecticut, aimed at “revitaliz[ing] an economically
distressed city.”80  This plan was preceded by a determination in 1990
by a state agency that the city of New London was a “distressed mu-
nicipality.”81  The development plan passed in 2000 designated a pri-
vate non-profit agency, the New London Development Corporation
(“NLDC”), to be in charge of the implementation of the revitalization
73. Id.
74. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. (citing W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
671–72 (1981)).
77. Id. at 245.
78. Id.
79. Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
80. Id. at 472.
81. Id. at 473.
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plan.82  The plan itself was meant to create jobs, generate tax revenue,
make the City more attractive, and “create leisure and recreational
opportunities.”83  The NLDC targeted real estate in a ninety-acre
area, and began making offers to the landowners within the area for
acquisition of the property.  While some landowners accepted the of-
fers, some residents refused, including the petitioners in this case, and
the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings that gave rise to the
suit.84
The Kelo case gave the Court an opportunity to reiterate some of its
previous eminent domain determinations, while also broadening the
definition of public use.  While the plan was found to not benefit a
particular class of individuals, some of the land to be acquired was not
to be used by the general public.85  A section of the property to be
acquired was earmarked for commercial space for private busi-
nesses.86 Still, the Court cited the continuous expansion of the public
use requirement, finding that the definition of public use was “use by
the public” which was an unworkable standard.87  In doing so, the
Court embraced a broader and “more natural interpretation of public
use as ‘public purpose.’”88  While the term “public purpose” had been
used previously in Supreme Court eminent domain cases, this was the
first time the Court unambiguously adopted the much broader public
purpose definition of public use.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found economic revitaliza-
tion to be a sufficient public purpose, satisfying the public use require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment.89  While the City was not confronted
with the need to remove blight, the Court found that the City’s deter-
mination that the area was sufficiently distressed as to justify a pro-
gram of economic rejuvenation was entitled to the Court’s
deference.90  In comparing the City’s goals to those of the legislatures
in Midkiff and Berman, the Court held it had no basis to exempt eco-
nomic development from its “traditionally broad understanding of
public purpose.”91
III. THE REACTION TO THE PUBLIC USE EXPANSION
Some scholars argue the courts have greatly expanded upon the
original meaning of public use within the Takings Clause,92 while
82. Id. at 475.
83. Id. at 474–75.
84. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75.
85. Id. at 479.
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id. at 485.
88. Id. at 480.
89. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id. at 485.
92. See, e.g., McFarland, supra note 27; Kochan, supra note 39.
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others believe the public use clause is merely a derscription of a com-
pensable taking.93  Many scholars look for evidence of the intent of
the founders to create a solid definition of what constitutes a public
use.94  While some scholars see the attitudes at the time of the found-
ing of the United States as fiercely protective of property rights,95
others have interpreted historical documents as showing the recent
judicial view of public use within the Fifth Amendment is in further-
ance of how colonial law and the early U.S. government regulated
land.96
In support of her argument that the expansion of the judicial defini-
tion of a public use is unjustified, Katherine McFarland points out that
the courts have continually asked the legislatures for increasingly
higher levels of justification for encroachments on individual rights
outside the takings arena.97  While courts continue to question gov-
ernment intrusion into citizens’ freedom of expression and equal pro-
tection, the level of scrutiny courts give to government takings has
consistently diminished over the past half century.98  By implementing
a reverence to unchecked legislative determinations of what consti-
tutes a public use, the door has been opened for misuse of the eminent
domain power.99
Frequently, scholars who argue against the expansion of the public
use definition point to the potential for legislative abuse of eminent
domain brought on by powerful special interests.  Examples that pur-
port to show this include large companies using the legislature to con-
demn property needed for strip malls and casinos.100  As the argument
goes, this continued expansion of the public use definition has made
enforcement of the public use requirement impossible, will lead to a
93. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 1248.
94. See, e.g., McFarland, supra note 27, at 144 (“To understand the true purpose of
the eminent domain power, it is necessary to look both to its historical use and the
understanding of property rights at the time of the nation’s founding.”); William
Michael Treanor, supra note 16; John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signifi-
cance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
95. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SAIGEN, Land Use Without Zoning 227 (1972).
96. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 94, at 1281. (“Property ownership was ‘not an abso-
lute right that exempted the individual owner from corporate oversight,’ but rather ‘a
right of stewardship that the public entrusted to an individual, for both private and
public benefit.’”) (citing Barry A. Shain, The Myth of American Individualism: The
Protestant Origins of American Political Thought 183 (1994)).
97. McFarland, supra note 27, at 142.
98. See Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYR-
ACUSE L. REV. 285, 287 (2000) (“The conclusion that follows is that so far as the
federal courts are concerned neither the state legislatures nor Congress need be con-
cerned about the public use test in any of its ramifications.”).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d. 102 (N.J. Super.
1998); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981); Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).
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distortion of natural market forces, and could cause a detrimental ef-
fect on states unwilling to use the courts’ broadened definition.101
While Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, wrote that the
City of New London’s plan did not warrant a more stringent standard
of judicial review, he opined that a more narrowly drawn category of
takings may be appropriate for increased judicial scrutiny.102  One cat-
egory may be “private transfers in which the risk of undetected imper-
missible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption of
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”103  In the Kelo
case, the private parties were unknown at the time of the drafting of
the redevelopment plan.104  Justice Kennedy seemed to hint that if a
legislature draws up a plan with a specific private party involved for
development, suspicions of favoritism may lead to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of invalidity.105  Justice Kennedy did not flesh out this alter-
native “test” for examining public use determinations, he only
specified that eminent domain disputes must be decided based on the
specific facts of each case.  Nevertheless, the inclusion of a private de-
veloper at the latter stages of planning by the City of New London
was not enough in the eyes of Justice Kennedy to justify an exception
to the public use doctrine developed through Midkiff and Berman.
On the forefront of the backlash from the Kelo decision were the
four dissenting Justices.  Justice O’Connor wrote the dissenting opin-
ion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas.106  Justice O’Connor’s main argument was that, by allowing
private property to be taken “under the banner of economic develop-
ment,” all private property may now be vulnerable to a governmental
taking, as long as the legislature deems that the new party will use it in
a more publicly beneficial way.107  Not only is all private property now
vulnerable to governmental taking, Justice O’Connor wrote, but to
hold that “the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent
ordinary use of private property render economic development tak-
ings ‘for public use’ is to wash out any distinction between private and
public use of property—and thereby effectively to delete the words
‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause.”108
Justice O’Connor goes on to question the Court’s reliance on the
“secondary benefits” to be enjoyed by the public, as a result of the
101. Kristi M. Burkard, No More Government Theft of Property! A Call to Return
to A Heightened Standard of Review After the United States Supreme Court Decision
in Kelo v. City of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 132 (2005-2006).





106. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494.
107. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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revitalization plan, as evidence of the satisfaction of the public use
requirement.109  When the legislature’s aim is to cure a pre-existing
harm, such as in Midkiff and Berman, the public purpose was realized
when the harmful use was eliminated.110  “Because each taking di-
rectly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was
turned over to private use.”111  Here, Justice O’Connor argued, the
result of the revitalization plan is a mere upgrade, adding only periph-
eral benefits to the public.112  These benefits are not meant to cure
some pre-existing harm to the local landowners, such as the blight and
unequal landownership dealt with in earlier eminent domain cases.
The dissenting Justices in the Kelo case laid the groundwork for a
bevy of criticism aimed at the Supreme Court, with some states show-
ing concern over the potential for abuse of eminent domain power by
the government.113
In contrast, other scholars contend that the words “public use” as
written in the Fifth Amendment are no more than a description of a
type of taking that is compensable.114  Scholars argue that “the mem-
bers of the founding generation generally understood that the power
to take property for public use is reserved to the legislature alone and
is a function of the principle of consent inherent in a representative
government.”115  As a result, those who read the public use require-
ment as a limitation on the legislative power of eminent domain are
misreading the intent of the drafters.116
However, as discussed below, characterizing the phrase “public
use” as descriptive rather than limiting renders its inclusion a nullity.
Further, if property rights are properly placed in the class of funda-
mental rights, then the infringement of that right for the purpose of a
public use must be examined under heightened judicial scrutiny.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
USE REQUIREMENT
There are two changes the Court must make in order to protect the
people’s individual right to property.  First, the Court must narrow the
definition of public use to fit within the original intent of the founders.
Second, the Court must recognize the right to property as a funda-
mental right, thereby making it subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Fur-
ther, the Court must expand upon Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
109. Id. at 501.
110. Id. at 500.
111. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 501.
113. See, e.g., Justin B. Kamen, A Standardless Standard: How A Misapplication of
Kelo Enabled Columbia University to Benefit from Eminent Domain Abuse, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1217 (2012); Gold, supra note 46, at 1119.
114. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 8, at 1248.
115. See, e.g., id. at 1247.
116. Id. at 1248.
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the Kelo case, and find that eminent domain takings performed for
the reason of economic revitalization must be viewed with a rebutta-
ble presumption of invalidity.
A. The Definition of Public Use Must Fall Within the
Original Intent of the Founders
As discussed above, lack of historical documentation as to the foun-
ders’ intent in writing the Fifth Amendment has left a void when try-
ing to determine the true meaning of public use.  However, if we look
at the language of the Fifth Amendment, the modern interpretation of
what constitutes a public use is much broader than what the text in-
tends.117  Indeed, if the founders intended a broad definition of public
use, that is, “if the only requirement were that the federal government
be acting pursuant to a legitimate purpose, then no phrase would be
needed at all, since that requirement is implicit throughout the Consti-
tution.”118  The modern interpretation of public use is so broad as to
be “simply duplicative of the legitimate-state-interest test that every
deprivation of property must satisfy under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.”119
In fact, if the phrase “for public use” is not a narrowing requirement
for the taking of land under the Fifth Amendment, then the clause is
essentially meaningless.120  Specifically, the Fifth Amendment con-
tains two other prepositional phrases beginning with the word “for” in
addition to the phrase “for public use”:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
. . . ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.121
In each case, “the prepositional phrase cannot be read as broadening
rather than narrowing the clause’s scope.”122
At this point, the Court has failed to address the argument that the
phrase “for public use” must be a narrowing of the Amendment.  In-
stead, the Court holds that the narrow view of public use as strictly
“use by the public” has been eroded over time, and the expansive
modern view of public use is a product of the State’s police powers.123
The strict public use requirement is dismissed as a test too difficult to
administer and supposedly proved to be “impractical given the diverse
117. Falls, supra note 2, at 369.
118. Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531,
537 (1995).
119. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1079 (1993).
120. Id. (citing Richard Epstein, TAKINGS 161 (1985)).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
122. Clegg, supra note 118, at 537.
123. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005).
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and always evolving needs of society.”124  This language is curious,
however; a judicial determination over whether or not condemned
property will be used by the public would seem necessary when the
elimination of an individual’s property rights are at stake.
Further, as discussed below, while it is true that legislatures often
use their eminent domain powers for the economic benefit of their
community, the increasingly expansive definition of public use fails to
properly reflect the intent of the founders.125  The Supreme Court
need not look any further than the text of the Fifth Amendment and
eschew the expansive modern definition of public use in favor of the
intended narrow definition.
B. The Right to Property Is a Fundamental Right and Must Be
Subject to Strict Judicial Scrutiny
While the right to property is listed in the Fifth Amendment along-
side the rights of life and liberty, which have long been held to be
fundamental rights, it has not enjoyed the same judicial protection.  If
we follow the line of thinking that the framers viewed property rights
as tantamount to liberty interests, then the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment must be viewed as protecting a fundamental
right.126 It is well established that when reviewing a violation of a fun-
damental right, the courts use a heightened form of judicial scru-
tiny.127  While the government’s exercise of its eminent domain power
emanates from its police power, this police power cannot burden an
individual’s fundamental right without first passing a heightened stan-
dard of judicial review.128
When examining a constitutional violation under strict scrutiny, the
court looks to whether or not the legislative enactments are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.129  While legislative deter-
minations subject to strict scrutiny are routinely held to be in violation
of the Constitution, invocations of the public use requirement rarely
meet the same fate. The Land Reform Act of 1967 as described in the
Midkiff case is a good example.  The legislation was written with the
goal of equalizing the housing market in the State of Hawaii.130  The
law itself is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal, as the Act would
have little relevance once the housing market was adjusted.  Further, a
compelling state interest was delineated by the Hawaiian legisla-
ture.131  The inflated real estate prices resulting from the majority of
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Tschetter, supra note 60, at 226.
126. See Treanor, supra note 16, at 709.
127. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
128. Id. at 722.
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
130. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
131. See id.
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the state’s land being concentrated within relatively few owners were
a legitimate threat to the public welfare.132  Thus, Hawaii’s Land Re-
form Act of 1967 would likely have survived a strict scrutiny review by
the courts.
An example of a legislative determination that is less likely to sur-
vive strict scrutiny is one similar to the integrated development plan
passed in the Kelo decision.  In making its determination that its rede-
velopment plan was a valid public use, the City of New London cited
Connecticut’s legislative declaration of a policy recognizing that the
state’s “economic welfare” hinges upon the “growth of industry and
business.”133  Therefore, “permitting and assisting municipalities to
acquire and improve unified land . . . for industrial and business pur-
poses . . . are public uses.”134  This broad declaration of what consti-
tutes a public use is less likely to survive strict scrutiny.  No explicit
goal is mentioned, only a blanket statement that the state may procure
lands for “industrial and business purposes.”135  Therefore, legislative
determinations such as that of New London’s City Council are un-
likely to be narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny.
Eminent domain is one of the most powerful tools wielded by the
government.  The power to deprive a person of property should not
be subject to a lower standard of review such as rational basis that
almost guarantees the government prevails.  It is clear then, that the
courts must act to provide more protection for individual property
rights with the stricter form of scrutiny reserved for other fundamen-
tal rights such as life and liberty.  The State should have the burden to
show that the public’s need for a particular piece of private property
serves a compelling government interest, and the forced transfer of
land should only occur in exigent socioeconomic circumstances.136
C. In the Alternative, Takings Under the Pretense of Economic
Development Must Overcome A Presumption of Invalidity
When legislation “on its face . . . [falls] within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution,” the Court is required to use a heightened form of
scrutiny.137  While Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in the Kelo case
states that a “presumption of invalidity is not warranted for economic
development takings in general,” he does agree that a more stringent
standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff might
be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings.138
132. Id. at 242.
133. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186 (2004).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally Jones, supra note 98, at 312.
137. Falls, supra note 2, at 376 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 (1938)).
138. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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There is judicial precedent for a heightened standard of review when
making a legislative determination that seems to violate a specific pro-
hibition in the Constitution.139
Justice Kennedy’s test would trigger a heightened form of review in
a narrower category of cases, such as when a legislature decides to
invoke its eminent domain powers for anything that, on its face, is not
a public use.  Justice Kennedy frets that a “broad per se rule or a
strong presumption of invalidity . . . would prohibit a large number of
government takings that have the purpose and expected effect of con-
ferring substantial benefits on the public at large and so do not offend
the Public Use Clause.”140 However, just as Justice Kennedy has ac-
knowledged, “there may be categories of cases in which the transfers
are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or
the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should
presume an impermissible private purpose.”141
In order to rebut the presumption of invalidity, all the State would
have to show is the transfer of land is not aimed at conferring “bene-
fits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or
pre-textual public benefits.”142  While this more moderate approach
still fails to sufficiently protect property rights as fundamental or
within the intent of the founders, it does provide more protection than
what currently exists.  Additionally, by delineating what triggers a re-
view under heightened scrutiny, this framework may lead to less litiga-
tion and a more efficient land development process.
In summary, with such an expansive definition of public use, and
the Court’s unfettered deference to legislative determinations, the
current judicial approach fails to protect the people from unjust tak-
ings.  A heightened standard of review for takings outside the narrow
view of a public use, while not ideal, would provide increased protec-
tion for individual property rights without being insurmountable for
legislatures.
V. CONCLUSION
As America grows older, the need for urban revitalization has in-
creased.  The use of eminent domain by Congress and state legisla-
tures as a means of effectuating change has grown in recent times.
With this advent of a heavier reliance by the government on eminent
domain comes the need for reform.  While the government has an in-
terest in using eminent domain to protect the public welfare, such pro-
tection should not come at the expense of the fundamental rights of
the people.  The power of eminent domain is unique in this respect;
139. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)
140. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 493.
142. Id. at 490.
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the sovereign’s inherent power over the lands under its control must
harmonize with the peoples’ fundamental right to property.  While a
broad definition of public use is inherently a limitation in theory,
courts rarely overturn a legislative determination of public use.143
Though the use of strict scrutiny for public use determinations
would be consistent with the founders’ intent, even a heightened form
of review for a narrow category of cases would provide more protec-
tion for property rights.  The current lack of a judicial check on the
government’s use of eminent domain tips the scales too far in favor of
the government.  The expansion of the public use requirement has
made it virtually impossible for a landowner to successfully challenge
a public use determination by a legislature, and the time has come for
the Court to properly regulate the eminent domain power of the
legislature.
143. The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599, 608 (1949) (“True, even a broad concept of “public use” implies a
limitation, and many state courts still accord vocal acknowledgment to the concept.
But they invariably find that the particular project under consideration is satisfactorily
public in nature.”).
